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Objectives. Two studies explored the relative efficacy of a morality-based versus a 
competence-based self-affirmation manipulation at increasing acceptance of 
personally relevant health-risk information. In accordance with prior theorising (e.g., 
Cohen & Sherman, 2014), it was hypothesized that the morality affirmation would be 
more effective than the competence affirmation in such contexts, as the former targets 
a different domain to that threatened by the health-risk information. 
Design. Both studies employed a cross-sectional experimental design.  
Methods. Participants were presented with a morality affirmation, competence 
affirmation or no affirmation control prior to reading a message about the risks of (a) 
not engaging in daily dental flossing (Study 1) and (b) red meat consumption (Study 
2). Participants subsequently completed a number of measures assessing acceptance 
of the message.  
Results. In line with predictions, findings from both studies demonstrated that the 
morality affirmation precipitated greater acceptance of personally relevant health-risk 
information compared to the competence affirmation, as reflected in more positive 
attitudes (Studies 1 and 2) and intentions (Study 1). Study 2’s findings further 
suggested that the superior efficacy of the morality affirmation in health-related 
contexts could not simply be attributed to a general tendency for this affirmation to 
outperform the competence affirmation.  
Conclusions. The nature of the value affirmed may be a critical factor in 
determining the success of self-affirmation manipulations in health-related domains.  
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Morality or competence? The importance of affirming the appropriate dimension of 
self-integrity. 
A major challenge facing society is how best to persuade people of the need to 
change their behaviour, either for their own benefit (e.g., the prevention of personal 
illness) or for a greater good (e.g., the protection of the environment). Public 
communication campaigns often highlight the negative consequences of people’s 
actions, the rationale being that this will motivate behaviour change. However, such 
approaches have frequently been found to be ineffective (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 
2001). Moreover, people at whom such messages are aimed (e.g., those who engage 
in the targeted health-detrimental behaviour) have sometimes been shown to be the 
most likely to derogate the message (Freeman, Hennessy, & Marzullo, 2001) and the 
least likely to be persuaded by it (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992).  
Self-affirmation theory contends that people are continually motivated to protect 
their self-integrity, where the latter has been described as the belief that the self is 
“adaptively and morally adequate, that is, competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, 
capable of free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes…” (Steele, 1988, p. 
262). From this perspective, information detailing the negative consequences of one’s 
chosen behaviours may present a threat to self-integrity, insofar as it challenges the 
view of the self as a competent and moral individual who would not engage in 
behaviours that may harm the self or others. Consequently, the defensive processing 
of threatening information can be interpreted as a mechanism aimed at safeguarding a 
person’s self-integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
Critically, however, self-affirmation theory asserts that potential threats to self-
integrity can be countered by affirming the self in an important domain (Steele, 1988). 
Thus, if individuals are given the opportunity to reflect on an important source of self-
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integrity, this should allow them to maintain their overall sense of self-integrity in the 
face of potentially threatening information. As a result, self-affirmation should pre-
dispose individuals to consider such information in a more open and less biased 
manner, without needing to resort to defensive responses (Cohen & Sherman, 2014).  
In support of this position, a growing body of research evidence has demonstrated 
that self-affirmed participants are more open to personally-relevant health-risk 
information than are non-affirmed participants. For example, self-affirmation has been 
shown to promote positive intentions and behaviour change in the context of reducing 
one’s alcohol consumption (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011; Harris & Napper, 
2005; Scott, Brown, Phair, Westland, & Schüz, 2013); heightened perceptions of 
control, self-efficacy and intentions to reduce cigarette smoking (Armitage, Harris, 
Hepton, & Napper, 2008; Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 2007); more positive 
attitudes, stronger intentions, greater levels of response efficacy and corresponding 
behaviour change in the context of increased physical activity (Cooke, Trebaczyk, 
Harris, & Wright, 2014; Jessop, Sparks, Buckland, Harris, & Churchill 2014, Study 
1); and greater levels of response-efficacy, self-efficacy and consumption with regard 
to eating five portions of fruit and vegetables a day (Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, two recent meta-analyses have reported reliable, beneficial 
effects of self-affirmation on cognitive and behavioural outcomes in health-related 
contexts (Epton, Harris, van Koningsbruggen, Kane, & Sheeran, 2014; Sweeney & 
Moyer, 2014). 
In sum, a body of evidence supports the utility of self-affirmation manipulations in 
increasing acceptance of personally relevant health-risk information. However, a 
significant limitation to our understanding of self-affirmation effects is that little is 
known about how to operationalize self-affirmation manipulations most effectively 
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(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Various techniques have been employed to induce self-
affirmation in health-related contexts, with little attention directed towards exploring 
which manipulations are most effective and why this might be the case (cf. Epton et 
al., 2014; Jessop, Simmonds, & Sparks, 2009). The most frequently utilised self-
affirmation manipulation involves participants contemplating a personally important 
value (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Epton et al.; Sweeney & Moyer, 2014), and the 
results of a recent meta-analysis indicated that self-affirmation was most effective at 
changing behaviour when the affirmation task involved writing about such a value 
(Epton et al.). However, scant consideration has been paid to the nature of the actual 
value that is selected and affirmed. Furthermore, since participants typically choose 
the target value themselves (e.g., Sherman, Nelson, & Steele., 2000; Harris & Napper, 
2005), the nature of the value that is affirmed may vary from person to person within 
a given study. This presents an important limitation to the interpretation of research 
findings and hinders the validity of comparisons made across studies. 
It has been posited that the affirmed value should be from a different domain to 
that of the threat (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; but see Steele, 1988), as domain-relevant 
self-affirmations might increase resistance to change by consolidating self-certainty 
and impunity regarding the threatened domain (Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 
1997; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). 
However, research findings are not wholly consistent, with some studies 
demonstrating apparent benefits of domain-relevant self-affirmations (Klein, Lipkus, 
Scholl, McQueen, Cerully, & Harris, 2010; see also Sherman & Cohen, 2006, p. 225; 
Steele, 1988).  
To date, no research has systematically manipulated the domain of the value 
affirmed prior to exposure to personally-relevant health-risk information (cf. Burson, 
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Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012; Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2011, Study 2). It 
would seem to be important to establish whether different-domain value affirmations 
are more effective at promoting openness to personally relevant health-risk 
information compared to domain-relevant value affirmations (a perspective which we 
refer to as the “different domain hypothesis” from now on). Research has identified 
two basic and distinct sets of traits which appear to reflect two corresponding value 
domains: those relating to competence and those relating to morality1 (Wojciszke, 
2005a). We contend that the provision of personally-relevant health-risk information 
usually presents a threat primarily to one’s sense of competence, insofar as such 
information directly challenges one’s view of the self as competent, capable and 
adaptive, i.e., as someone who is sensible enough not to engage in behaviours that 
could potentially harm the self. By contrast, such information (which typically focuses 
on the personal costs of engaging in the behaviour) should pose less of a threat to 
one’s sense of morality, as morality is primarily concerned with the welfare of others 
(Mackie, 1977). In accordance with the different domain hypothesis, we would thus 
predict that a self-affirmation manipulation which focuses on a value related to 
competence should be less effective at increasing acceptance of personally-relevant 
health-risk information than a self-affirmation manipulation which focuses on a value 
that is related to a different and distinct domain (viz. morality). 
In order to test this proposition, the current paper presents two studies designed to 
explore the relative efficacy of a competence-based and a morality-based values 
                                                 
1
 It is perhaps noteworthy that these two domains appear to be highly compatible with Steele’s 
original exposition of self-integrity as pertaining to “adaptive and moral adequacy” (p. 289). 
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affirmation manipulation at increasing acceptance of personally relevant health-risk 
information.  
Study 1 
Study 1 compared the efficacy of a competence-based and a morality-based 
affirmation manipulation at increasing acceptance of a message presenting the health-
related risks of not engaging in regular dental flossing, which we believed would pose 
a threat primarily to recipients’ sense of competence. We selected dental flossing as 
our target behaviour as we wanted to focus on a health-related behaviour with no 
obvious links to morality (in comparison, for example, to risky driving, where one’s 
behaviour might have direct implications for the wellbeing of others). It was expected 
that participants in the morality affirmation condition would be more accepting of the 
health-risk information compared to those in the competence affirmation condition. 
Specifically, and as empirical hypotheses, it was predicted that participants in the 
morality affirmation condition would report more positive attitudes towards dental 
flossing (reflecting a greater acceptance that performance of this behaviour would be 
advantageous) and stronger intentions to floss, compared to those in the competence 
affirmation condition. 
Method 
Participants2 
Ninety three participants completed the study and met the inclusion criterion that 
they were not engaging in daily dental flossing. The majority (n = 87) were (non-
psychology) students; 68 (73.12%) participants were female. Ages ranged from 19-50 
years (M = 22.91, SD = 5.36).  
                                                 
2
 Further information on participants in both studies is given in Supporting Information. 
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Materials 
Participants completed a questionnaire including the following sections: 
Demographic information. Participants indicated their age, gender, student status 
and subject studied (if they were a student). 
Past behaviour. Participants’ past behaviour was measured by the following item: 
“On how many days in the last week have you used dental floss as part of your dental 
routine?” (0 to 7).  
Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants in the competence affirmation and 
morality affirmation conditions were asked to choose their most important value from 
a list of 9 values and write a short statement about it, focusing on why the value was 
so important to them and how it had influenced their behaviour. Critically, for 
participants in the competence affirmation condition, the 9 values given were related 
to competence (being able, being well-organised, competence, effectiveness, 
efficiency, intelligence, inventiveness, logicalness, and resourcefulness) while for 
participants in the morality affirmation condition, the 9 values given were related to 
morality (altruism, fairness, forgiveness, goodness, honestly, kindness, loyalty, 
sincerity, and tolerance). Participants in the control condition received no self-
affirmation task 3.  
Health-risk information. Participants were asked to read a passage comprising 
three paragraphs detailing the potential link between not flossing one’s teeth and 
developing gum disease and coronary heart disease. They were additionally informed 
that the American Dental Association recommends daily dental flossing. Pilot 
                                                 
3
 Further information on this manipulation, including associated pilot studies, the rationale for using a 
no-task control condition and the frequency with which each value was selected, is given in Supporting 
Information.  
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research4 suggested that this message was perceived as presenting more of a threat to 
competence than to morality.  
Prior knowledge. Participants were asked to respond to the item “Before reading 
the information above, were you aware that flossing your teeth might help prevent 
coronary heart disease?” (yes / no).   
Attitudes. Participants responded to the statement “Flossing my teeth daily over 
the next seven days as part of my dental routine would be:” on three pairs of semantic 
differentials (bad [1] to good [7], harmful [1] to beneficial [7], and foolish [1] to wise 
[7]), α = .81.  
Intentions. Participants’ intentions were measured by two items, e.g., “I intend to 
floss my teeth daily over the next seven days as part of my dental routine” (definitely 
do not [1] to definitely do [7]), r(90) = .96, p < .001.  
Procedure and design 
Participants were approached opportunistically at several venues on a UK 
university campus (e.g., the library) and asked if they would be willing to take part in 
a study exploring their beliefs about dental flossing. All participants completed the 
questionnaire alone and were instructed to complete the materials in the order that 
they were presented (i.e., in the order detailed above). Participants were sequentially 
allocated to one of the three conditions resulting from the oneway design (Self-
Affirmation Manipulation: competence affirmation [n = 30], morality affirmation [n = 
31], and control [n = 32]). Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the 
institutional Ethics Committee. 
Results 
Participants’ past behaviour scores ranged from 0 to 6 (M = 0.68, SD = 1.39). 
                                                 
4
 Please see Supporting Information  
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Preliminary Analyses 
Chi-square analysis and one-way ANOVAs revealed no difference between 
conditions in terms of participants’ gender, age or past behaviour5 (ps > .21).  
Message Acceptance 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted to establish whether Self-
Affirmation Manipulation influenced attitudes or intentions. The relevant means and 
standard deviations are given in Table 1.  
Attitudes. There was a significant effect of Self-Affirmation Manipulation on 
attitudes, F(2, 90) = 3.66, p = .030, ηp2 = .08. A planned contrast demonstrated that 
participants in the morality affirmation condition reported more positive attitudes 
towards dental flossing than participants in the competence affirmation condition, 
t(49.59) = 2.45, p = .018, Cohen’s d = 0.70 (Ms = 6.61 & 5.99 respectively). 
Additional contrasts6 revealed that the control condition differed significantly only 
from the morality affirmation condition.  
Intentions. There was a significant effect of Self-Affirmation Manipulation on 
intentions, F(2, 90) = 3.09, p = .050, ηp2 = .06. A planned contrast demonstrated that 
participants in the morality affirmation condition reported greater intentions to floss 
their teeth daily than participants in the competence affirmation condition t(90) = 
2.49, p = .015, Cohen’s d = 0.52 (Ms = 4.14 & 2.88 respectively). Additional 
contrasts6 showed that the control condition did not differ significantly from either 
affirmation condition.  
                                                 
5
 Due to the small number of participants (n = 5) indicating that they had previously known all of the 
health-risk information presented, it was not possible to test whether prior knowledge of this 
information differed across conditions. 
6
 Contrasts with the control condition for both studies are reported in full in Supporting Information. 
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Discussion 
The results of Study 1 support the prediction that a morality-related affirmation 
manipulation would be more effective than a competence-related affirmation 
manipulation at increasing acceptance of a message detailing the health-related risks 
of not engaging in daily dental flossing. These findings are broadly consistent with the 
different domain hypothesis. However, they could simply reflect a general tendency 
for self-affirmation manipulations which focus on morality to be more effective than 
those which focus on competence, irrespective of the match between the foci of the 
affirmation and the personally relevant health-risk information.  
Study 2 
In light of the above, Study 2 was designed to test whether Study 1’s finding that 
the morality-based affirmation outperformed the competence-based affirmation was 
contingent on its targeting a different domain to that threatened. Thus in Study 2 we 
manipulated the focus of the information provided, such that it presented a threat to 
either competence or morality. Participants in the health-risk information conditions 
read a message about the damage caused to one’s health by red meat consumption. As 
with Study 1, we hypothesized that such personally relevant health-risk information 
should pose a threat primarily to the individual’s sense of competence. Participants in 
the environmental-risk information conditions read a message about the damage 
caused by red meat consumption to the environment and for future generations. We 
hypothesized that this information should pose a threat primarily to recipients’ sense 
of morality, insofar as the focus is on the harm caused to others (see Wojciszke, 
2005a, 2005b). We elected to focus on red meat consumption because we required a 
behaviour which could convincingly be framed in terms of either (a) negative health-
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related consequences for the individual or (b) negative consequences for the 
environment and for others.  
We predicted that the morality affirmation would be more effective than the 
competence affirmation at eliciting message acceptance for those in the health-risk 
information conditions, as the former affirms a different domain to that which is 
threatened. By contrast, following the same rationale, we predicted that the 
competence affirmation condition would be more effective than the morality 
affirmation at eliciting message acceptance for those in the environmental-risk 
information conditions.  
Method 
Participants2 
One hundred and eight participants completed the study satisfactorily and met the 
inclusion criterion that they typically ate red meat on more than two days of the week. 
Fifty-five participants (50.93%) were students. Sixty-four (59.26%) participants were 
male, 41 (37.96%) were female, and three did not indicate their gender. Ages ranged 
from 16-87 years (M = 30.68, SD = 14.46).  
Materials 
Participants completed a questionnaire on red meat consumption, including the 
following sections. They were informed that “for the purposes of the current study, 
red meat is defined as beef, lamb, pork and veal”.  
 Past behaviour. Participants’ past behaviour was measured by the following item 
“On average, on how many days per week do you eat red meat?” (0 to 7).  
Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants in the competence affirmation, 
morality affirmation and control conditions completed the same manipulations as in 
Study 1. 
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Risk information7. Participants in the health-risk information conditions read a 
passage detailing the potential health-damaging consequences of red meat 
consumption. Participants in the environmental-risk information conditions read a 
passage detailing the potential environment-damaging consequences of red meat 
consumption. The passages were matched closely for word length, information type 
and structure. Both passages finished by stating “National guidelines recommend 
eating red meat no more than twice a week.” 
Pilot research8 suggested that the health-risk information was perceived as 
presenting more of a threat to competence than morality, whereas the environmental-
risk information was perceived as presenting more of a threat to morality than 
competence.  
Prior knowledge. Participants were asked to respond to the item “I already knew 
all of the information about the risks of red meat consumption presented on the 
previous page” (strongly disagree [1] to strongly agree [7]). 
Message derogation. Participants were asked to what extent they felt the 
information about the risks of red meat consumption (i) was overblown, (ii) was 
exaggerated, (iii) tried to manipulate their feelings and (iv) tried to strain the truth 
(strongly disagree [1] to strongly agree [7]; adapted from Ruiter, Verplanken, Kok, & 
Werrij, 2003), α = .87. 
Attitudes. Participants responded to the statement “For me to eat red meat no more 
than twice a week would be:” on five pairs of semantic differentials (harmful [1] to 
beneficial [7], good [1] to bad [7], negative [1] to positive [7], foolish [1] to wise [7], 
and worthless [1] to valuable [7]), α = .82.  
                                                 
7
 Further details on the risk information provided are given in Supporting Information.  
8
 Please see Supporting Information  
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Response-efficacy. Participants’ beliefs in the benefits of eating read meat no more 
than twice a week for their health (for those in the health risk information conditions) 
or the environment (for those in the environmental risk information conditions) were 
assessed by the corresponding version of two items, e.g., “If I eat red meat no more 
than twice a week it will be beneficial to my health / the environment” (strongly 
disagree [1] to strongly agree [7]; adapted from Ruiter et al., 2003), r(105) = .66, p < 
.001.  
Intentions. Participants’ intentions were measured by three items, e.g., “I intend to 
eat red meat no more than twice a week” (extremely unlikely [1] to extremely likely 
[7]), α = .83.  
Demographic information. Participants indicated their age, gender, student status 
and subject studied (if they were a student). 
Procedure and design 
Participants were recruited opportunistically at several venues (e.g., a library) and 
via contacts of the researchers and asked if they would be willing to take part in a 
study exploring their beliefs about red meat consumption. All participants completed 
the questionnaire alone and were instructed to complete the materials in the order that 
they were presented (i.e., in the order detailed above). 
Participants were sequentially allocated to one of the six conditions resulting from 
the 3 (Self-Affirmation Manipulation: control, competence affirmation, morality 
affirmation) by 2 (Risk Information: health risk information, environmental risk 
information) design. 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the institutional Ethics 
Committee. 
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Results 
The number of days on which participants ate red meat in the average week 
ranged from 3 to 7 (M = 3.81, SD = 1.00).  
Preliminary Analyses 
Chi-square analyses and two-way ANOVAs revealed no difference between 
conditions in terms of participants’ gender, student status, age, prior knowledge or 
past behaviour (ps > .12).  
Message Acceptance 
A series of 3 (Self-Affirmation Manipulation: control, competence affirmation, 
morality affirmation) by 2 (Risk Information: health risk information, environmental 
risk information) ANOVAs was conducted with each of the following measures 
entered in turn as the dependent variable: message derogation, attitudes, response-
efficacy and intention. The relevant means and standard deviations are given in Table 
2.  
Message derogation. There was no significant main effect of either Self-
Affirmation Manipulation or Risk Information on message derogation and no 
significant interaction effect (ps > .37). 
Attitudes. There was no significant main effect of either Self-Affirmation 
Manipulation or Risk Information on attitudes. Importantly, however, there was a 
marginally significant interaction effect, F(2, 100) = 2.69, p = .073, ηp2 = .05, see 
Figure 1.  
A planned contrast was conducted to test our hypothesis that among participants 
given the health-risk information, those in the morality affirmation condition would 
report more positive attitudes than those in the competence affirmation condition. The 
findings of this contrast revealed a significant difference in the predicted direction 
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between the attitude scores of those in the morality affirmation and competence 
affirmation conditions, F(1, 100) = 5.45, p = .022, ηp2 = .05 (Ms = 4.86 & 4.04 
respectively). Additional contrasts6 revealed that the control condition differed only 
from the morality affirmation condition.  
A further planned contrast was conducted to test our hypothesis that among 
participants given the environmental-risk information, those in the competence 
affirmation condition would report more positive attitudes than those in the morality 
affirmation condition. This contrast revealed no difference between the attitude scores 
of those in the competence affirmation and morality affirmation conditions, F(1, 100) 
= 0.25, p = .616, ηp2 = .00. Additional contrasts6 revealed no differences between the 
control condition and either affirmation condition. 
Response-efficacy. There was no significant main effect of either Self-Affirmation 
Manipulation or Risk Information on response-efficacy. There was, however, a 
significant interaction effect, F(2, 101) = 3.13, p = .048, ηp2 = .06, see Figure 2.  
A planned contrast was conducted to test our hypothesis that among participants 
given the health-risk information, those in the morality affirmation condition would 
report higher levels of response-efficacy than those in the competence affirmation 
condition. While the pattern of means was in the predicted direction, the resultant 
contrast did not reveal a statistically significant difference between the response 
efficacy scores of those in the morality affirmation and competence affirmation 
conditions, F(1, 101) = 2.62, p = .109, ηp2 = .03 (Ms = 4.66 & 3.82 respectively). 
Additional contrasts6 revealed a marginally significant difference between the control 
condition and the competence affirmation condition.  
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A further planned contrast was conducted to test our hypothesis that among 
participants given the environmental-risk information, those in the competence 
affirmation condition would report higher levels of response-efficacy than those in the 
morality affirmation condition. The findings of this contrast revealed a marginally 
significant trend in the predicted direction between the response-efficacy scores of 
those in the competence affirmation and morality affirmation conditions, F(1, 101) = 
3.09, p = .082, ηp2 = .03 (Ms = 4.48 & 3.67 respectively). Additional contrasts6 
revealed no differences between the control condition and either affirmation 
condition. 
Intentions. There was no significant main effect of Self-Affirmation Manipulation 
on intentions and no significant interaction effect (ps > .43). There was, however, a 
significant main effect of Risk Information, F(1, 101) = 7.15, p = .009, ηp2 = .07, 
reflecting the fact that those in the health-risk information conditions reported 
stronger intentions to eat meat no more than twice a week than did those in the 
environmental-risk information conditions (marginal means = 3.58 & 2.82 
respectively). 
Discussion 
Study 2’s findings provide some further support for the hypothesis that a morality-
based affirmation would be more effective than a competence-based affirmation at 
increasing acceptance of personally relevant health-risk information. Thus, after 
reading information detailing the health-related risks of red meat consumption, 
participants in the morality affirmation condition reported more positive attitudes 
towards limiting their red meat consumption. While this same pattern of findings held 
for response-efficacy (and for behavioural intentions; Table 2), it failed to reach 
statistical significance. 
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In addition, Study 2’s findings provided some limited support for the 
complementary hypothesis that a competence-based affirmation would be more 
effective than a morality-based affirmation at increasing acceptance of information 
detailing the damage caused by red meat consumption to the environment and for 
future generations. We had hypothesized that this information should pose a threat 
primarily to recipients’ sense of morality, and hence that the competence-based 
affirmation would be more effective as it affirms a different domain to that which is 
threatened (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). However, our prediction was supported 
statistically for only one of our four outcome measures, with participants in the 
competence affirmation condition reporting marginally higher levels of response-
efficacy than those in the morality affirmation condition. While the same pattern of 
findings was apparent for both attitudes and behavioural intention (Table 2), the mean 
difference failed to approach statistical significance for either outcome.  
Critically, however, the findings of Study 2 suggest that the superior performance 
of the morality-based affirmation at increasing acceptance of personally relevant 
health-risk information does not simply reflect a general tendency for this 
manipulation to outperform the competence-based affirmation. Rather, findings 
provide tentative support for the position that it may be the mismatch between the foci 
of the personally relevant health-risk information and the morality-based affirmation 
manipulation which is important for the success of the latter. 
General Discussion 
Self-affirmation manipulations in health-related domains have typically involved 
participants focusing on a personally important value (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Sherman et al., 2000). The findings of the current research provide some support for 
the assertion that the nature of the value which is affirmed might have important 
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implications for the success, or otherwise, of a self-affirmation manipulation. 
Specifically, we contended that information detailing the negative consequences of 
one’s health-related behaviours presents a threat primarily to one’s sense of 
competence, as it threatens one’s perception of oneself as a competent and capable 
decision maker. Accordingly, in line with the different-domain hypothesis (Blanton et 
al., 1997; Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sivanathan et al., 
2008), we predicted that a competence-based affirmation would be less effective than 
a morality-based affirmation at increasing acceptance of such personally relevant 
health-risk information, as the former targets the same domain as that which is 
threatened.  
In line with these predictions, Study 1 demonstrated that a morality-based 
affirmation precipitated greater acceptance of a message detailing the health-risks of 
not engaging in daily flossing compared to a competence-based affirmation, with 
participants in the morality affirmation condition reporting more positive attitudes 
towards daily flossing and stronger intentions to engage in this behaviour. Study 2 
provided some further support for the related hypothesis that the same morality-based 
affirmation would result in greater acceptance of a message detailing the health-risks 
of red meat consumption compared to the competence-based affirmation, with 
participants in the morality affirmation condition reporting more positive attitudes 
towards eating red meat no more than twice a week. However, there was no 
significant impact of the mortality affirmation (versus the competence affirmation) on 
message derogation, response efficacy or behavioural intentions (albeit the pattern of 
means was in the predicted direction for the latter two constructs).  
The failure to replicate the finding of Study 1 with regard to behavioural 
intentions could potentially reflect differences between the behaviours under 
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investigation. For example, in Study 1, the targeted action involved the (increased) 
uptake of a health promoting behaviour, whereas in Study 2 it required the reduction 
of an established health-damaging behaviour. Furthermore, dental flossing may 
represent a fairly simple private behaviour to implement, compared to dietary choices 
which may be relatively complex and influenced by factors such as culture, normative 
variables and shared decision-making. Nonetheless, it should be noted that self-
affirmation manipulations have successfully promoted intentions to reduce the 
performance of moderately complex and established health-damaging behaviours in 
previous research (e.g., Armitage et al., 2008).  
The findings of Study 2 further suggest that the superior performance of the 
morality-based affirmation in health-related domains could not simply be attributed to 
a general tendency for this affirmation to outperform the competence-based 
affirmation. This adds support to the position that it may be the mismatch between the 
foci of the threat and the value affirmed that is important in determining the success of 
self-affirmation manipulations. We acknowledge, however, that the disparity between 
the performance of the morality affirmation and the competence affirmation could 
reflect other core differences between them. For example, we did not assess the 
relative impact of these manipulations on variables that have been hypothesised to (a) 
signify the extent to which people are self-affirmed (e.g., self-appraisal; Napper, 
Harris, & Epton, 2009) or (b) mediate the effects of self-affirmation on outcomes 
(e.g., positive other-directed feelings; Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). Our 
rationale for avoiding the inclusion of such manipulation checks (e.g., Napper et al., 
2009) or mediators (e.g., Crocker et al., 2008) was that we were concerned that 
completion of the resultant items might in itself be self-affirming for control 
participants (see Harris & Epton, 2009; Napper et al., 2009). Nonetheless, future 
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research would benefit from establishing whether morality- and competence-based 
self-affirmation manipulations have equivalent impacts on variables thought to be 
important for the underlying process, not least because it seems intuitively plausible 
that a morality-based self-affirmation might be more likely to promote (for example) 
positive other-directed feeling than would a competence-based manipulation.  
It is interesting to observe that the differential performance of the affirmation 
manipulations was not always attributable solely to increased message acceptance in 
the different domain condition.  For example, in Study 1, the difference in intentions 
appeared to be driven as much by the lower intention scores of those in the 
competence affirmation condition (compared to the control condition) as by the higher 
intention scores of those in the morality affirmation condition. Certainly, it is striking 
that the competence affirmation condition consistently conferred no advantage in the 
context of health-related information, compared to the control condition. Indeed, on 
occasion, it exerted a detrimental impact on outcomes (e.g., response efficacy, Study 
2), contributing to a literature documenting backlash effects of same-domain 
affirmation manipulations (Blanton et al., 1997; Sivanathan et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, it is perhaps noteworthy that participants selected their own value in 
both the competence affirmation and the morality affirmation conditions, albeit they 
were constrained to choose from a list of competence-related and morality-related 
values respectively. This approach allowed participants to select a personally 
important value, while simultaneously enabling us to manipulate the value-domain 
affirmed. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the specific competence- and morality-
related values selected may have differed in the extent to which they overlapped with 
the behavioural domains under investigation. Future research could explore the impact 
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of restricting participants to write about the same (competence- or morality-related 
value) on outcomes.  
The findings of the present research have potentially important applied 
implications for the integration of values-based self-affirmation manipulations into 
health promotion materials. Specifically, they suggest that careful consideration 
should be paid to the nature of the value affirmed, as this may have important 
implications for the success - or otherwise - of the resultant intervention. They also 
highlight the need to develop a clearer understanding of the nature of the threat 
presented in health promotion materials, not least with regard to which aspect of the 
self-concept is most likely to be threatened.  Importantly, as the findings suggest that 
the value affirmed might benefit from being in a different domain to the threat, this 
may present unique challenges to those involved in the design of integrated self-
affirmation manipulations, as it may prove more difficult to seamlessly integrate an 
unrelated value affirmation into health promotion materials than a domain-relevant 
value affirmation.  
One limitation to the present research is that participants were allocated to 
condition sequentially. While preliminary analyses revealed no differences between 
conditions on socio-demographic variables or baseline behaviour in either study, 
future research should employ methods of random allocation. A further limitation to 
the current programme of research is that we did not explore the impact of our 
manipulations on behavioural outcomes. Rather, our primary focus was on the 
capacity of the different value-domain affirmations to promote health-congruent 
cognitions. Because previous self-affirmation research has demonstrated that such 
changes in cognition do not necessarily translate into subsequent behaviour change 
(e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005), exploration of the impact of different value-domain 
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affirmations on behaviour change represents a promising avenue for future research. 
Furthermore, research should seek to establish whether the findings reported here hold 
across behavioural domains and generalize across populations.  
In sum, the research reported here represents the first systematic attempt to 
manipulate the nature of the value that is affirmed prior to exposure to personally-
relevant health-risk information (cf. Burson et al., 2012; Pavey et al., 2011). Our 
findings highlight the importance of the value category in determining the success (or 
otherwise) of self-affirmation manipulations in health-related domains and suggest 
that the interrelationship between the foci of the value affirmed and the threat may be 
an important determinant of the relative efficacy of competence-based and morality-
based affirmation manipulations.  
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Table 1  
Outcome measures by Condition: Study 1 
 
 
 
Control  
M (SD) 
Competence affirmation 
M (SD) 
Morality affirmation 
M (SD) 
Attitudes 5.97 (1.20) 5.99 (1.18) 6.61 (0.77) 
Intentions 3.55 (2.04) 2.88 (1.92) 4.14 (1.98) 
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Table 2  
Outcome Measures by Condition: Study 2 
 Health Risk Information Environmental Risk Information 
 Control  
 
 
M (SD) 
Competence 
affirmation 
M (SD) 
Morality 
affirmation 
M (SD) 
Control  
 
M (SD) 
Competence 
affirmation 
M (SD) 
Morality 
affirmation 
M (SD) 
Message derogation 4.74 (1.28) 4.20 (1.29) 4.21 (1.37) 4.44 (1.70) 4.72 (1.39) 4.72 (1.49) 
Attitudes 4.09 (1.00) 4.04 (0.87) 4.86 (0.95) 4.43 (1.04) 4.43 (1.17) 4.27 (0.84) 
Response-efficacy 4.71 (0.73) 3.82 (1.54) 4.66 (1.50) 4.03 (1.59) 4.48 (1.56) 3.67 (1.64) 
Intentions 3.65 (1.52) 3.36 (1.43) 3.73 (1.44) 3.02 (1.32) 2.96 (1.54) 2.48 (1.42) 
  
31 
 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mean attitude scores as a function of Self-Affirmation Manipulation and 
Risk Information.  
 
Figure 2. Mean response efficacy scores as a function of Self-Affirmation 
Manipulation and Risk Information.  
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Figure 1 
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